User:Cernnunos Gunn/Old user page/Asymmetric Warfare - Doctrine: Difference between revisions

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 Techniques are the general, detailed methods fighters and commanders use to perform assigned missions and functions, specifically methods of fitting and using ships and the roles those ships play on the battlefield. Procedures are standard and detailed courses of action that describe how to perform tasks. Every competent militry force adapts. Units modify techniques and procedures constantly according to circumstance and knowledge gained through experience. This instrument - the techniques and procedures that should be in constant flux according to changing political and tactical environments, is what is commonly referred to as standard operating procedures, or SOPs, and at a minimum these need to be reviewed and changed whenever a new combat technique, ship type, or change in the mechanics of wars and declaring them, occur in Eve.
+Every Competent military force adapts. Units modify techniques and procedures constantly according to circumstance and knowledge gained through experience. Making changes to techniques and procedures that will be effective across the force requires experimentation, training, and dissemination. These actions are part of the adaptive nature of combat. Adaptation is critical to military success, since warfare - whether asymmetric or not - deals with uncertainty.
+===Uncertainty and the Unexpected===
+German military theorist Carl von Clausewitz noted that uncertainty is fundamental to warfare. To some greater or lesser degree, uncertainty might be lessoned as a function of improved command & control, and intelligence; but it cannot be eliminated. Uncertainty is an enduring facet of warfare and arises from -
+     * A lack of intelligence about enemy intentions, ways, means, and ends;
+     * Lack of knowlegde about timing of actions, locations of forces and assetts, and their goals in engaging in war;
+     * The relative strengths & weaknesses the enemy has and what they have done in the past and what others have done to them and the results;
+     * Recent changes in their fleet doctrine, ship builds, size & resources.
+Certainly evidence exists that the potential for asymmetric operations increases as a function of the number of potential conflicts and combinations of opponents, technical means, cultural preconceptions, and values. In short - with the new war dec system CCP has implemented, the potential for war in general and asymmetric warfare in particular has vastly increased for Eve University.
+==Conclusion of Asymmetric Warfare Doctrine==
+Asymmetry is really nothing more than taking the level of uncertainty, or surprise, to a new level that involves novel ways, means, or even ends. From a doctrinal perspective, our response is the same, whether the enemy's asymmetry is low-level tactical innovation or a completely new exploit or novel strategic approach. We must be astute enough to recognize that something has changed and then be flexible enough to create an effective response. Doctrine must facilitate this.
+Dealing with the unexpected requires adjustment to the actual situiation. '''''To the degree that doctrine becomes overly proscriptive, it becomes irrelevant.''''' Worse, it instills in the command a penchant for proceeding "by the book" whether warranted by circumstances or not. Doctrine must embrace a philosophy of initiative and creative thinking to counter uncertainty. The more asymmetric the opponent, the more important this is. Training must complement a philosophy of operations that emphasizes uncertainty and training doctrine must stress pilots and leaders by putting them in unfamiliar circumstances and forceing them to think creatively.
+To remain relevant, dpctrine must recognize the elements of uncertainty and the unexpected. Of course, doctrine cannot predict the enexpected - yet it must go further than banalities. Doctrine must offer the educational foundation and the tool set required to comprehend and effect successful operations, ''not in spite of, but BECAUSE of their increasing asymmetric nature.'' Imparting the tool set is a function of training, education, and self-study. Applying the tools is a function of leadership. Fleet doctrine should embody a philosophy of operations (WSOP) that recognizes uncertainty as a fundamental aspect of warfare. Doctrine must illustrate the adaptive nature of a thinking, willful opponent and stress the absence of prescription in doctrine.