User:Cernnunos Gunn/Old user page/Asymmetric Warfare - Doctrine

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Introduction

This discussion about the doctrine of asymmetric warfare is a general introduction to the topic as it applies to the reality of New Eden. A global definition of asymmetric warfare is: War between belligerents whose relative power differs significantly, or whose strategy or tactics differ significantly. While old, this will serve for our purpose. You may find it interesting that in current modern application, the term is no longer useful and has been largely replaced by more narrow, specific terms.

Given the strict definition of symmetry used in today's military theory, if any war were perfectly symmetrical, then stalemate would be the norm and victory would be based solely on luck. This truism coupled with the ambiguous nature of the term 'asymmetric warfare' is the primary reason for the term's waning and non-use in today's teaching. Nevertheless, it can be applied to strategy and tactics in Eve to good effect.

History of Asymmetric Warfare

The concept of asymmetric warfare has been around for centuries. According to Sun Tzu, all warfare is asymmetric because the principle is to exploit an enemy's strength while attacking his weaknesses. The Greeks used the Phalanx to defeat a mounted enemy. Hannibal used a feint in the middle of his forces with a double-envelopment to achieve victory over the Romans. Every time a new tactic or technology changed the fortunes and power of one army over another, an imbalance or asymmetry occurred - the weighting to one side created the conditions for victory.

Sun Tzu, in his monumental work The Art of War, written more than 1,500 years ago, stated:

"All warfare is based on deception. When confronted with an enemy one should offer the enemy a bait to lure him; feign disorder and strike him. When he concentrates, prepare against him; where he is strong, avoid him."

This quote illustrates that a good strategist or tactician should always look for asymmetry and exploit it. Tzu's concept of the asymmetric nature of all warfare was echoed in the mid-20th century by B.H. Liddell Hart. He taught "the wisest strategy avoids the enemy's strength and probes for weakness." Probes? Must have been an early Eve player!

After the Napoleonic Wars the German strategist Carl von Clausewitz grasped the fact that war must not be simply intertwined with politics; rather, it must be subservient to politics and waged to achieve political goals -

"We see, therefore, that war is not merely an act of policy but a true political instrument, a continuation of political intercourse, carried on with other means. War in general, and the commander in any specific instance, is entitled to require that the trend and designs of policy shall not be inconsistent with these means. That, of course, is no small demand, but however much it will affect political aims in a given case, it will never do more that modify them. The political objective is the goal, war is the means of reaching it, and means can never be considered in isolation from their purpose."

Like those of Sun Tzu and Liddell Hart, Clausewitz's principles apply equally to conventional vs traditional vs asymmetric warfare. But this understanding that warfare is an extension of politics rather than a raw matching up of firepower is key to understanding the nature of asymmetric warfare doctrine.

For brevity's sake I shall pass over many good works, like the writings of Otto Von Bismarck, and move into the modern era. A monumental work on the concept of asymmetric warfare was published in 1964 by an experienced French officer. David Galula's Counterinsurgency Warfare, written prior to the United States' main involvement in Vietnam, reads like a field manual for counterinsurgency in places like today's Iraq. He recognized that the insurgent and the counterinsurgent, although fighting the same war in time & space, are in fact fighting very different wars in terms of tactics, objectives, and ideals. He states:

"There is an asymmetry between the opposite camps of a war. This phenomenon results from the very nature of the war, from the disproportion of strength between opponents at the outset, and from the difference in essence between thei assets and their liabilities." The insurgent has a formidable asset - the ideological power of a cause on which to base his action. the counterinsurgent has a heavy liability - she is responsible for maintaining order and function within her territory. The insurgent's (attacker's) strategy will naturally aim at converting his intangible assets into concrete ones, the counterinsurgent's strategy at preventing her intangible liability from dissipating her concrete assets.

Finally, in 1999 two colonels - Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui, of the People's Republic of China - wrote and published a book entitled Unrestricted Warfare. This work brought many previously unconsidered concepts into the realm of warfare and altered thinking to preceive every act of national power as an act of war. It also suggested other catastrophic and disruptive threats as the only means to wage war against a country that is vastly superior in traditional and conventional military might:

"While we are seeing a relative reduction in military violence, at the same time we definitely are seeing an increase in political, economic, and technological violence. However, regardless of the form the violence takes, war is war, and a change in the external appearance does not keep any war from abiding by the principles of war."

Doctrine for Asymmetric Warfare

Any discussion of doctrine and asymmetry must begin by acknowledging the tension inherent between the role of doctrine and the nature of asymmetry in warfare. Doctrine should succinctly express the collective wisdom about how to conduct military operations. In 1923, historian J.F.C. Fuller wrote that "the central idea of an army is known as doctrine, which to be sound must be principles of war, and which to be effective must be elastic enough to admit of mutation in accordance with change in circumstance. In its ultimate relationship to the human understanding this central idea or doctrine is nothing else than common sense - that is, action adapted to circumstance."

While asymmetric warfare encompasses a wide scope of theory, experience, conjecture, and definition, the implicit premise is that asymmetric warfare deals with unknowns, with surprise in terms of ends, ways, and means. The more dissimilar the opponent, the more difficult it is to anticipate their actions. Unfortunately, uncertainty is inseparable from the nature of war, and asymmetry increases uncertainty. Those who expect doctrine and Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTP) to provide solutions and checklists for action are soon disabused of that notion during actual operations. If and when enemy surprises us with a capability, our response is necessarily ad hoc and less effective. Depending on our preconceptions and ability to adapt, the advantage an opponent enjoys might persist. Doctrine must prepare the Fleet Commander & leadership with a mindset to deal with uncertainty quickly and effectfully.

Developing Doctrine

To get beyond the tension inherent between asymmetry and doctrine, our focus is on two observations about asymmetry that to many of our potential opponents are highly relevant to the development of ILN doctrine. The first is the requirement to understand that to most of our potential enemies we appear to be as asymmetric as they appear to us. The second point is that doctrine cannot predict the nature and form of asymmetric conflicts, but it can forecast the necessary traits and body of conceptual knowledge necessary to cope with a chaotic asymmetric operational environment.

To understand the role of doctrine, we must distinguish between doctrine and TTP. Most people using the term doctrine are referring to the whole body of doctrine and fail to separate out each component's specific role. Defining these roles is a seemingly minor distinction, but it is important to understanding since each component plays a different part in how the fleet operates. More germane is that each component has a slightly different role with respect to asymmetry, and each has a different cyclic rate in terms of its development and useful life.

Effective doctrine explains how we expect to fight and operate based on past experience and a best guess of what lies ahead. Doctrine:

• Provides the link between research, theory, history, experimentation, and practice
• Encapsulates a body of knowledge and experience so it can be applied
• Provides common understanding and a common language, which allows us to articulate clearly and succinctly the fleet's mission

The narrow definition of doctrine is "fundamental principles by which the military forces of elements thereof guide their actions in support of Corporate objectives. It is authoritative but requires sound judgement in application". (US Joint publication 1-02, DoD - non-classified)

E-Uni doctrine should provide an operational concept, a philosophy of how the ILN operates. In doing so, doctrine must reconcile operational requirements with the force's perceived strengths. Fleets operate best when capitalizing on demonstrated capabilities and asymmetric strengths. History is replete with examples of fleet failures occasioned by attempts to match an enemy's style of warfare despite friendly forces being ill-suited to the challenge.

Tactics

Tactics deals with how units are employed during combat. The actual application of tactics is highly circumstantial and is both a science and art. The science of tactics encompasses the understanding of those military aspects of tactics - capabilities, techniques, and procedures - that can be measured and codified. The art of tactics consists of three interrelated aspects: the creative and flexible array of means to accomplish assigned missions; decision making under conditions of uncertainty when faced with an intelligent enemy; and understanding the human dimension - the effects of combat on pilots. The unit commander invokes the art of tactics to solve problems within his or her FC's intent by choosing from interrelated options, such as forms of maneuver, tactical mission tasks, and arrangement and choice of control measures (gate camps, offensive or defensive patrols, scouts, etc).

Tactics are whatever we do against an opponent when we arrange forces to counter them. What differentiates tactics against an asymmetric enemy is that we might not have ever used that particular combination of options before, or we may have to incorporate new & novel options to counter asymmetry. When confronted by a situation, leaders must choose from a variety of possible solutions and adopt their solution to circumstances at the point of engagement.

Techniques and Procedures

Techniques are the general, detailed methods fighters and commanders use to perform assigned missions and functions, specifically methods of fitting and using ships and the roles those ships play on the battlefield. Procedures are standard and detailed courses of action that describe how to perform tasks. Every competent military force adapts. Units modify techniques and procedures constantly according to circumstance and knowledge gained through experience. This instrument - the techniques and procedures that should be in constant flux according to changing political and tactical environments, is what is commonly referred to as standard operating procedures, or SOPs, and at a minimum these need to be reviewed and changed whenever a new combat technique, ship type, or change in the mechanics of wars and declaring them, occur in Eve.

Every Competent military force adapts. Units modify techniques and procedures constantly according to circumstance and knowledge gained through experience. Making changes to techniques and procedures that will be effective across the force requires experimentation, training, and dissemination. These actions are part of the adaptive nature of combat. Adaptation is critical to military success, since warfare - whether asymmetric or not - deals with uncertainty.

Uncertainty and the Unexpected

German military theorist Carl von Clausewitz noted that uncertainty is fundamental to warfare. To some greater or lesser degree, uncertainty might be lessened as a function of improved command & control, and intelligence; but it cannot be eliminated. Uncertainty is an enduring facet of warfare and arises from -

• A lack of intelligence about enemy intentions, ways, means, and ends;
• Lack of knowledge about timing of actions, locations of forces and assets, and their goals in engaging in war;
• The relative strengths & weaknesses the enemy has and what they have done in the past and what others have done to them and the results;
• Recent changes in their fleet doctrine, ship builds, size & resources.

Certainly evidence exists that the potential for asymmetric operations increases as a function of the number of potential conflicts and combinations of opponents, technical means, cultural preconceptions, and values. In short - with the new war dec system CCP has implemented, the potential for war in general and asymmetric warfare in particular has vastly increased for Eve University.

Conclusion of Asymmetric Warfare Doctrine

Asymmetry is really nothing more than taking the level of uncertainty, or surprise, to a new level that involves novel ways, means, or even ends. From a doctrinal perspective, our response is the same, whether the enemy's asymmetry is low-level tactical innovation or a completely new exploit or novel strategic approach. We must be astute enough to recognize that something has changed and then be flexible enough to create an effective response. Doctrine must facilitate this.

Dealing with the unexpected requires adjustment to the actual situation. To the degree that doctrine becomes overly proscriptive, it becomes irrelevant. Worse, it instills in the command a penchant for proceeding "by the book" whether warranted by circumstances or not. Doctrine must embrace a philosophy of initiative and creative thinking to counter uncertainty. The more asymmetric the opponent, the more important this is. Training must complement a philosophy of operations that emphasizes uncertainty and training doctrine must stress pilots and leaders by putting them in unfamiliar circumstances and forcing them to think creatively.

To remain relevant, doctrine must recognize the elements of uncertainty and the unexpected. Of course, doctrine cannot predict the unexpected - yet it must go further than banalities. Doctrine must offer the educational foundation and the tool set required to comprehend and effect successful operations, not in spite of, but BECAUSE of their increasing asymmetric nature. Imparting the tool set is a function of training, education, and self-study. Applying the tools is a function of leadership. Fleet doctrine should embody a philosophy of operations (WSOP) that recognizes uncertainty as a fundamental aspect of warfare. Doctrine must illustrate the adaptive nature of a thinking, willful opponent and stress the absence of prescription in doctrine.