Principles of war

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I have decided to try to post some information on one of the classes I an developing for E-Uni just to put it out there and see if it is useful to the membership and what things I need to modify. As with all wiki entries this is a work in progress for me, and I will try to keep up with it as my real life allows.

The principles of war - basic class is crafted to give a brief introduction to the theory and concepts behind pvp combat decision making in New Eden. Later classes will cover advanced topics and application of these principles, but in this introduction I only intend to expose the seeker to the basic theory of modern combat, and get them think about the "big picture" that fleet commanders must consider.

It is important for the student to understand that these principles are rarely used in isolation. They work in complementry ways to augment and support one another. For example, we will consider the principle of MASS in conjunction with the principle of ECONOMY OF FORCE because in real practice, to achieve sufficient mass at one part of the battlefield, we need to apply economy of force in another. This and other cooperative relationships between these principles will become evident to you as you progress through your study of the principles of war.

The principles of mass and economy of force

In reality, all fleet battles are won by mass in one way or another. The problem facing the fleet commander is how that mass is achieved. The objective is not to outnumber the enemy, but rather to bring superior force to bear at the critical point. This requires the commander to do 2 things - first to identify the critical point, and then to strike that point with the greatest mass they can muster. Unless a fleet has unlimited resources achieving mass at one point means using it sparingly elsewhere, via economy of force decisions.

The principles of offensive and suprise

There are very few examples of a battle being won by a defensive strategy, and even in those examples the force must follow up with a strong offensive action or they will have no lasting effect. A tactical victory on defensive terms tends to make a determined enemy learn from their mistakes and try again. A successful defensive battle like Agincourt is rare - mostly because it depends on finding an enemy dull enough to attack a strong position with insufficient force. The underlying thrust of the principle of offensive is that a battle should be fought with the objective of gaining victory, not avoiding defeat. A commander should view defensive actions as either economy of force maneuvers to gain an offensive advantage elsewhere (diversion) or as a stalling action to bring about a more favorable battle.

The principles of simplicity and unity of command

We may apply Occam's Razor to warfare: the simplest solution is usually the best. By "simple" I mean no more complex than your command & control system can support. A poorly organized fleet must rely on utter fundamentals, and is by nature a blunt instrument. The point being that simplicity is a relative thing.

A basic violation of simplicity is to ignore unity of command. Quarreling or uncoordinated commanders create fatal confusion.

The principles of maneuver and surprise

Maneuver is attempting to checkmate an enemy by movement, reducing their options to unpleasent ones and forcing them to flee or give battle on unfavorable terms. Swift and unexpected movement can create the element of surprise, which may be as simple showing up at an unexpected place or as complicated as mastering a command and control cycle shorter than the enemies.

The principle of objective

Not embracing the principle of objective is a major reason fleet battles go badly. The purpose of the battle is not just to go out and have a good fight; it is to achieve victory, and victory is attained by securing objectives. One of the greatest dangers facing a FC is the temptation to get distracted from these objectives. As soon as they do that, they yield the initiative to the enemy.

The principle of security

It has been wisely said that no battle plan survives the first contact with the enemy. Prudent commanders take precautions to avoid unpleasent surprises, and those precautions are generally based on a shrewd estimate of what the enemy's likely courses of action are, and which they will use.

Security can be obtained in a number of ways. It is most important to remember that the use of such security measures is not for insurance against defeat, but rather a means of protecting the commander from distraction from their objectives. Without proper security a fleet may spend its energies responding to trivial threats and thus become distracted from their true objective. Some small action or skirmish becomes their immediate objective, thus giving the initiative to the enemy failing to accomplish the stated mission.

Theory of the center of gravity and the decisive point

Modern military thinking recognizes operational warfare as "the employment of military forces to attain strategic goals", and uses this throughout the design of any campaign. To the Fleet Commander (FC) this means they are responsible for the linkage of tactical actions, or engagements, to the ends desired at the strategic level. In order to be sucessful the FC must be capable of designing and executing campaign plans, and this in turn requires a thorough understanding of two important theoretical propositions.

The Center of Gravity

The first proposition concerns the concept of the center of gravity and its relationship to the overall strategic planning of the war campaign. The center of gravity is typically considered to be the sources of strength or balance that project the force. In New Eden this is manifested in the location of the mass of their force, and the fleet doctrine within that force. Furthermore, it is described as that characteristic, capability, or locality from which the force derives its freedom of action, physical strength, or will to fight.

Clausewitz offers some thoughts on identifying the center of gravity, which paraphrased states the commander must keep in mind the dominant charactersitics of both belligerents, and out of those characteristics a certain center of gravity develops, the hub of all power and movements, on which everthing depends.

The Decisive Point

The second concept evolves around the decisive point and its relationship to the center of gravity. The decisive point is the 'gateway' to the enemy's center of gravity. It is a location in both time and space, the possession of which will greatly aid one side in achieving victory over the other. In the case of the "battle of aldrat" in which the Ivy League fended of a large fleet of RvB who were intent on destroying our POS, this point was the Eygfe gate in Aldrat.

As is the case with the center of gravity, the characteristics of the decisive point can be very abstract, but in eve tends to be largly based on locations (entire systems or structures like POSs or station camping) and choke points - in Eve, usually gates between the locations. But it can also be a movable target, such as destroying a reinforcement fleet in detail prior to it giving aid to the enemy. According to Jomini, every point that must be controlled enroute to the objective, that is the center of gravity, is a decisive point.

This is a work in progress - more to follow!