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Asymmetric Warfare - Doctrine

Introduction

This discussion about the doctrine of asymmetric warfare is a general introduction to the topic as it applies to the reality of New Eden. A global definition of asymmetric warfare is: War between belligerents whose relative power differs significantly, or whose strategy or tactics differ significantly. While old, this will serve for our purpose. You may find it interesting that in current modern application, the term is no longer useful and has been largly replaced by more narrow, specific terms.

Given the strict definition of symmetry used in today's military theory, if any war were perfectly symmetrical, then stalemate would be the norm and victory would be based soley on luck. This truism coupled with the ambiguous nature of the term 'asymmetric warfare' is the primary reason for the term's waning and non-use in todays teaching. Nevertheless, it can be applied to strategy and tactics in Eve to good effect.

History of Asymmetric Warfare

The concept of asymmetric warfare has been around for centuries. According to Sun Tzu, all warfare is asymmetric because the principle is to exploit an enemy's strength while attacking his weaknesses. The Greeks used the Phalanx to defeat a mounted enemy. Hannibal used a feint in the middle of his forces with a double-envelopment to achieve victory over the Romans. Every time a new tactic ot technology changed the fortunes and power of one army over another, an imbalance or asymmetry occurred - the weighting to one side created the conditions for victory.

Sun Tzu, in his monumental work The Art of War, written more than 1,500 years ago, stated:

"All warfare is based on deception. When confronted with an enemy one should offer the enemy a bait to lure him; feign disorder and strike him. When he concentrates, prepare against him; where he is strong, avoid him."

This quote illustrates that a good strategist or tactician should always look for asymmetry and exploit it. Tzu's concept of the asymmetric nature of all warfare was echoed in the mid-20th century by B.H. Liddell Hart. He taught "the wisest strategy avoids the enemy's strength and probes for weakness." Probes? Must have been an early Eve player!

After the Napoleonic Wars the German strategist Carl von Clausewitz grasped the fact that war must not be simply intertwined with politics; rather, it must be subservient to politics and waged to achieve political goals -

"We see, therefore, that war is not merely an act of policy but a true political instrument, a continuation of political intercourse, carried on with other means. War in general, and the commander in any specific instance, is entitled to require that the trend and designs of policy shall not be inconsistant with these means. That, of course, is no small demand, but however much it will affect political aims in a given case, it will never do more that modify them. The political objective is the goal, war is the means of reaching it, and means can never be considered in isolation from their purpose."

Like those of Sun Tzu and Liddell Hart, Clausewitz's principles apply equally to conventional vs traditional vs asymmetric warfare. But this understanding that warfare is an extension of politics rather than a raw matching up of firepower is key to understanding the nature of asymmetric warfare doctrine.

For brevity's sake I shall pass over many good works, like the writings of Otto Von Bismarck, and move into the modern era. A monumental work on the concept of asymmetric warfare was published in 1964 by an experienced French officer. David Galula's Counterinsurgency Warfare, written prior to the United States' main involvment in Vietnam, reads like a field manual for counterinsurgency in places like today's Iraq. He recognized that the insurgent and the counterinsurgent, although fighting the same war in time & space, are in fact fighting very different wars in terms of tactics, objectives, and ideals. He states:

"There is an asymmetry between the opposite camps of a war. This phenomenon results from the very nature of the war, from the disproportion of strength between opponents at the outset, and from the difference in essence between thei assets and their liabilities." The insurgent has a formidable asset - the ideological power of a cause on which to base his action. the counterinsurgent has a heavy liability - she is responsible for maintaining order and function within her territory. The insurgent's (attacker's) strategy will naturally aim at converting his intangible assets into concrete ones, the counterinsurgent's strategy at preventing her intangible liability from dissipating her concrete assets.

Finally, in 1999 two colonels - Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui, of the People's Republic of China - wrote and published a book entitled Unrestricted Warfare. This work brought many previously unconsidered concepts into the realm of warfare and altered thinking to preceive every act of national power as an act of war. It also suggested other catactropic and disruptive threats as the only means to wage war against a country that is vastly superior in traditional and conventional military might:

"While we are seeing a relative reduction in military violance, at the same time we definitely are seeing an increase in political, economic, and technological violence. However, regardless of the form the violance takes, war is war, and a change in the external appearance does not keep any war from abiding by the principles of war."

This is a Work-in-progress - please check back frequently for updates.