Difference between revisions of "User:Masao battousai"
| Line 63: | Line 63: | ||
* Assign a second in command / Alliance - Local watcher, Echo / broadcaster, D-Scanner, 4, 5 | * Assign a second in command / Alliance - Local watcher, Echo / broadcaster, D-Scanner, 4, 5 | ||
* Feed command channel Autopilot settings and destinations | * Feed command channel Autopilot settings and destinations | ||
| − | * Instruct squad commanders to create squad channels that specify the Wing and Squad number | + | * Instruct squad commanders to create squad channels that specify the Wing and Squad number (W#S#) |
| − | |||
| − | (W#S#) | ||
* Instruct Squad Commanders to build their own squads with a total 4 Ewar, 4 Tackle, and 2 DD (including themselves / Tackle vs. Scout) | * Instruct Squad Commanders to build their own squads with a total 4 Ewar, 4 Tackle, and 2 DD (including themselves / Tackle vs. Scout) | ||
* Maximum limit of half T2 Battle cruiser) | * Maximum limit of half T2 Battle cruiser) | ||
| Line 549: | Line 547: | ||
''' Preparing for War ''' | ''' Preparing for War ''' | ||
| − | During times of peace, the most important task of any military is to prepare for war.Force | + | During times of peace, the most important task of any military is to prepare for war.Force planning is planning that is associated with the creation and maintenance of military capabilities. all force planning derives from a common set of concepts which describe how we will operate and perform certain key functions. Based on this common set of concepts, force planning integrates all the efforts of peacetime, including training, education, doctrine, organization, personnel management, and equipment acquisition. The operating forces must be organized to provide forward deployed or rapidly deployable forces capable of conducting expeditionary operations in any environment. The active operating forces must be capable of responding immediately to most types of crisis and conflict. For operations and training, Marine forces will |
| − | + | be formed into Marine air-ground task forces (MAGTFs). Operating forces should be organized for warfighting and then adapted for peacetime rather than vice versa. Commanders should establish habitual relationships between supported and supporting units to develop operational familiarity among those units. Doctrine is a teaching of the fundamental beliefs of the Marine Corps on the subject of war, from its nature and theory to its preparation and conduct. doctrine does not consist of procedures to be applied in specific situations so much as it sets forth general guidance that requires judgment in application. Doctrine demands professional competence among its leaders. The military profession is a thinking profession. Leaders must have a strong sense of the great responsibility of their office; the resources they will expend in war are human lives. Warfare requires intelligent leaders with a penchant for boldness and initiative down to the lowest levels. Not only must we not stifle boldness or initiative, but we must continue to encourage both traits in spite of mistakes. Consequently, trust is an essential trait among leaders— trust by seniors in the abilities of their subordinates and by juniors in the competence and support of their seniors. Relations among all leaders—from corporal to general— should be based on honesty and frankness regardless of disparity between grades. The purpose of all training is to develop forces that can win in combat. entry-level training provides a common experience, a proud heritage, a set of values, and a common bond of comradeship. Basic individual skills are an essential foundation for combat effectiveness and must receive heavy emphasis. Commanders at each echelon must allot subordinates sufficient time and freedom to conduct the training necessary to achieve proficiency at their levels. In order to develop initiative among junior leaders, the conduct of training—like combat—should be decentralized. Training programs should reflect practical, challenging, and progressive goals beginning with individual and small-unit skills and culminating in a fully combined arms. Collective training consists of drills and | |
| − | planning is planning that is associated with the creation and maintenance of military | + | exercises. Critiques are an important part of training because critical self-analysis, even after success, is essential to improvement. Professional military education is designed to develop creative, thinking leaders. The early stages of a leader’s career are, in effect, an apprenticeship. As an officer continues to develop, mastery should encompass a broader range of subjects and should extend to the operational level of war. The responsibility for implementing professional military education iis three-tiered: It resides not only with the education establishment, but also with the commander and the individual. The education establishment consists of those schools, subordinate commands, or outside agencies—established to provide formal education in the art and science of war. All commanders should consider the professional development of their subordinates a principal responsibility of command. Self-directed study in the art and science of war is at least equal in importance to maintain. Since war is at base a human enterprise, effective personnel management is important to success. The personnel management system should seek to achieve personnel stability within units and staffs as a means of fostering cohesion, teamwork, and implicit understanding. Finally, promotion and advancement policy should reward the willingness to accept responsibility and exercise initiative. Equipment should be easy to operate and maintain, reliable, and interoperable with other equipment. In order to minimize research and development costs and fielding time, exploit existing capabilities—“ off-the-shelf” technology—to the greatest extent possible. Acquisition should be a |
| − | + | complementary, two-way process based on established operating and functional concepts. Equipment is useful only if it increases combat effectiveness. The acquisition effort should balance the need for specialization with the need for utility in a broad range of environments. As much as possible, employment techniques and procedures should be developed concurrently with equipment to minimize delays between the fielding of the equipment and its usefulness to the operating forces. There are two dangers with respect to equipment: the overreliance on technology and the failure to make the most of technological capabilities. There are two basic military functions: waging war and preparing for war. Any military activities that do not contribute to the conduct of a present war are justifiable only if they contribute to preparedness for a possible future one. Clearly, we cannot afford to separate conduct and preparation. They must be inti-mately related because failure in preparation leads to disaster on | |
| − | capabilities. all force planning derives from a common set of concepts which describe how we will | ||
| − | |||
| − | operate and perform certain key functions. Based on this common set of concepts, force planning | ||
| − | |||
| − | integrates all the efforts of peacetime, including training, education, doctrine, organization, | ||
| − | |||
| − | personnel management, and equipment acquisition. The operating forces must be organized to | ||
| − | |||
| − | provide forward deployed or rapidly deployable forces capable of conducting expeditionary | ||
| − | |||
| − | operations in any environment. The active operating forces must be capable of responding | ||
| − | |||
| − | immediately to most types of crisis and conflict. For operations and training, Marine forces will | ||
| − | |||
| − | be formed into Marine air-ground task forces (MAGTFs). Operating forces should be organized for | ||
| − | |||
| − | warfighting and then adapted for peacetime rather than vice versa. Commanders should establish | ||
| − | |||
| − | habitual relationships between supported and supporting units to develop operational familiarity | ||
| − | |||
| − | among those units. Doctrine is a teaching of the fundamental beliefs of the Marine Corps on the | ||
| − | |||
| − | subject of war, from its nature and theory to its preparation and conduct. doctrine does not | ||
| − | |||
| − | consist of procedures to be applied in specific situations so much as it sets forth general | ||
| − | |||
| − | guidance that requires judgment in application. Doctrine demands professional competence among | ||
| − | |||
| − | its leaders. The military profession is a thinking profession. Leaders must have a strong sense | ||
| − | |||
| − | of the great responsibility of their office; the resources they will expend in war are human | ||
| − | |||
| − | lives. Warfare requires intelligent leaders with a penchant for boldness and initiative down to | ||
| − | |||
| − | the lowest levels. Not only must we not stifle boldness or initiative, but we must continue to | ||
| − | |||
| − | encourage both traits in spite of mistakes. Consequently, trust is an essential trait among | ||
| − | |||
| − | leaders— trust by seniors in the abilities of their subordinates and by juniors in the competence | ||
| − | |||
| − | and support of their seniors. Relations among all leaders—from corporal to general— should be | ||
| − | |||
| − | based on honesty and frankness regardless of disparity between grades. The purpose of all | ||
| − | |||
| − | training is to develop forces that can win in combat. entry-level training provides a common | ||
| − | |||
| − | experience, a proud heritage, a set of values, and a common bond of comradeship. Basic individual | ||
| − | |||
| − | skills are an essential foundation for combat effectiveness and must receive heavy emphasis. | ||
| − | |||
| − | Commanders at each echelon must allot subordinates sufficient time and freedom to conduct the | ||
| − | |||
| − | training necessary to achieve proficiency at their levels. In order to develop initiative among | ||
| − | |||
| − | junior leaders, the conduct of training—like combat—should be decentralized. Training programs | ||
| − | |||
| − | should reflect practical, challenging, and progressive goals beginning with individual and small | ||
| − | |||
| − | -unit skills and culminating in a fully combined arms. Collective training consists of drills and | ||
| − | |||
| − | exercises. Critiques are an important part of training because critical self-analysis, even after | ||
| − | |||
| − | success, is essential to improvement. Professional military education is designed to develop | ||
| − | |||
| − | creative, thinking leaders. The early stages of a leader’s career are, in effect, an | ||
| − | |||
| − | apprenticeship. As an officer continues to develop, mastery should encompass a broader range of | ||
| − | |||
| − | subjects and should extend to the operational level of war. The responsibility for implementing | ||
| − | |||
| − | professional military education iis three-tiered: It resides not only with the education | ||
| − | |||
| − | establishment, but also with the commander and the individual. The education establishment | ||
| − | |||
| − | consists of those schools, subordinate commands, or outside agencies—established to provide | ||
| − | |||
| − | formal education in the art and science of war. All commanders should consider the professional | ||
| − | |||
| − | development of their subordinates a principal responsibility of command. Self-directed study in | ||
| − | |||
| − | the art and science of war is at least equal in importance to maintain. Since war is at base a | ||
| − | |||
| − | human enterprise, effective personnel management is important to success. The personnel | ||
| − | |||
| − | management system should seek to achieve personnel stability within units and staffs as a means | ||
| − | |||
| − | of fostering cohesion, teamwork, and implicit understanding. Finally, promotion and advancement | ||
| − | |||
| − | policy should reward the willingness to accept responsibility and exercise initiative. Equipment | ||
| − | |||
| − | should be easy to operate and maintain, reliable, and interoperable with other equipment. In | ||
| − | |||
| − | order to minimize research and development costs and fielding time, exploit existing | ||
| − | |||
| − | capabilities—“ off-the-shelf” technology—to the greatest extent possible. Acquisition should be a | ||
| − | |||
| − | complementary, two-way process based on established operating and functional concepts. Equipment | ||
| − | |||
| − | is useful only if it increases combat effectiveness. The acquisition effort should balance the | ||
| − | |||
| − | need for specialization with the need for utility in a broad range of environments. As much as | ||
| − | |||
| − | possible, employment techniques and procedures should be developed concurrently with equipment to | ||
| − | |||
| − | minimize delays between the fielding of the equipment and its usefulness to the operating forces. | ||
| − | |||
| − | There are two dangers with respect to equipment: the overreliance on technology and the failure | ||
| − | |||
| − | to make the most of technological capabilities. | ||
| − | |||
| − | There are two basic military functions: waging war and preparing for war. Any military activities | ||
| − | |||
| − | that do not contribute to the conduct of a present war are justifiable only if they contribute to | ||
| − | |||
| − | preparedness for a possible future one. Clearly, we cannot afford to separate conduct and | ||
| − | |||
| − | preparation. They must be inti-mately related because failure in preparation leads to disaster on | ||
| − | |||
the battlefield. | the battlefield. | ||
| Line 676: | Line 556: | ||
''' The Conduct of War ''' | ''' The Conduct of War ''' | ||
| − | How we propose to accomplish a mission is the product of our understanding of the nature and the | + | How we propose to accomplish a mission is the product of our understanding of the nature and the theory of war and must be the guiding force behind our preparation for war. The challenge is to develop a concept of warfighting consistent with our understanding of the nature and theory of war and the realities of the modern battlefield. Our concept for winning under these conditions is a warfighting doctrine based on rapid, flexible, and opportunistic maneuver. Maneuver warfare is a warfighting philosophy that seeks to shatter the enemy’s cohesion through a variety of rapid, focused, and unexpected actions which create a turbulent and rapidly deteriorating situation with which the enemy cannot cope. Rather than wearing down an enemy’s defenses, maneuver warfare attempts to bypass these defenses in order to penetrate the enemy system and |
| − | + | tear it apart. The greatest effect of firepower is gen- erally not physical destruction— the cumulative effects of which are felt only slowly— but the disruption it causes. If the aim of maneuver warfare is to shatter the cohesion of the enemy system, the immediate object toward that end is to create a situation in which the enemy cannot function. Inherent in maneuver warfare is the need for speed to seize the initiative, dictate the terms of action, and keep the enemy off balance, thereby increasing his friction. Also inherent is the need to focus our efforts in order to maximize effect. An important weapon in our arsenal is surprise. Besides traits such as | |
| − | theory of war and must be the guiding force behind our preparation for war. The challenge is to | + | endurance and courage that all warfare demands, maneuver warfare puts a premium on certain particular human skills and traits. Orienting on the enemy is fundamental to maneuver warfare. We should try to understand the unique characteristics that make the enemy system function so that we can penetrate the system, tear it apart, and, if necessary, destroy the isolated components. If the enemy system, for example, is a fortified defensive works, penetrating the system may mean an infiltration or a violent attack on a narrow frontage at a weak spot to physically rupture the defense, after which we can envelop the enemy positions or roll them up laterally from within. We |
| − | + | should try to “get inside” the enemy’s thought processes and see the enemy as he sees himself so that we can set him up for defeat. First and foremost, in order to generate the tempo of operations we desire and to best cope with the uncertainty, disorder, and fluidity of combat, command and control must be decentralized. Second, since we have concluded that war is a human enterprise and no amount of technology can reduce the human dimension, our philosophy of command must be based on human characteristics rather than on equipment or procedures. Our philosophy of command must also exploit the human ability to communicate implicitly. This concept has several | |
| − | develop a concept of warfighting consistent with our understanding of the nature and theory of | + | practical implications. First, we should establish long-term working relationships to develop the necessary familiarity and trust. Second, key people—“actuals”— should talk directly to one another when possible, rather than through communicators or messengers. Third, we should communicate orally when possible, because we communicate also in how we talk—our inflections and tone of voice. Fourth, we should communicate in person when possible because we communicate also through our gestures and bearing. Commanders should command from where they can best influence the action, normally well forward. As part of our philosophy of command, we must recognize that war is inherently disorderly, uncertain, dynamic, and dominated by friction. In practical terms, this means that we must not strive for certainty before we act, for in so doing we will surrender the initiative and pass up opportunities. There are several points worth remembering about our command philosophy. our philosophy requires competent leadership at all levels. Our philosophy also requires familiarity among comrades because only through a shared understanding can we develop the implicit communication necessary for unity of effort. Since our goal is not merely the cumulative attrition of enemy strength, we must have some larger scheme for how we expect to achieve victory. The first requirement is to establish what we want to accomplish, why, and how. To influence the action to our advantage, we must project our thoughts forward in time and space. Through shaping, commanders gain the initiative, preserve momentum, and control the tempo of operations. The further ahead we think, the less our actual influence can be. The higher our echelon of command, the greater is our sphere of influence and the further ahead in time and space we must seek to shape the action. Decisionmaking is essential to the conduct of war since all actions are the result of decisions or of nondecisions.Since war is a conflict between opposing wills, we cannot make decisions in a vacuum. Time is a critical factor in effective decisionmaking—often the most important factor. Decisionmaking requires both the situational |
| − | + | awareness to recognize the essence of a given problem and the creative ability to devise a practical solution. Decisionmaking may be an intuitive process based on experience. Alternatively, decisionmaking may be a more analytical process based on comparing several options. We should base our decisions on awareness rather than on mechanical habit. Finally, since all decisions must be made in the face of uncertainty and since every situation is unique, there is no perfect solution to any battlefield problem. Mission tactics is just as the name implies: the tactics of assigning a subordinate mission without specifying how the mission must be accom- plished. Mission tactics benefits the senior commander by freeing time to focus on higher-level concerns rather than the details of subordinate execution. Mission tactics serves as | |
| − | war and the realities of the modern battlefield. Our concept for winning under these conditions | + | a contract between senior and subordinate. It is obvious that we cannot allow decentralized initiative without some means of providing unity, or focus, to the various efforts. We achieve this harmonious initiative in large part through the use of the commander’s intent, a device designed to help subordinates understand the larger context of their actions. There are two parts to any mission: the task to be accomplished and the reason or intent behind it. The intent for a unit is established by the commander assigning that unit’s mission—usually the next higher commander, although not always. It is often possible to capture intent in a simple “. . . in order to . . .” phrase following the assigned task. A clear expression and understanding of intent is essential to unity of effort. Another important tool for providing unity is the main ef- fort. We cannot take lightly the decision of which unit we designate as the main effort. Each commander should establish a main effort for each operation. Put simply, surfaces are hard spots—enemy strengths—and gaps are soft spots—enemy weaknesses. Gaps may in fact be physical gaps in the enemy’s dispositions, but they may also be any weakness in time, space, or capability. Similarly, a surface may be an actual strongpoint, or it may be any enemy strength. An appreciation for surfaces and gaps requires a certain amount of judgment. Due to the fluid nature of war, gaps will rarely be permanent and will usually be fleeting. In order to maximize combat power, we must use all the available resources to best advantage. We accomplish combined arms through the tactics and techniques we use at the lower levels and through task organization at higher levels. In so doing, we take advantage of the complementary characteristics of different types of units and enhance our mobility and firepower. |
| − | + | We have discussed the aim and characteristics of maneuver warfare. We have discussed the philosophy of command necessary to support this style of warfare. We have discussed some of the tactics of maneuver warfare. By this time, it should be clear that maneuver warfare exists not so much in the specific methods used—we do not believe in a formularistic approach to war—but in the mind of the Marine. In this regard, maneuver warfare, like combined arms, applies equally to the Marine expeditionary force commander and the fire team leader. It applies regardless of the nature of the con- flict, whether amphibious operations or sustained operations ashore, of low or high intensity, against guerrilla or mechanized foe, in desert or jungle. Maneuver warfare is a way of thinking in and about war that should shape our every action. It is a state of mind born of a bold will, intellect, initiative, and ruthless opportunism. It is a state of mind bent on shattering the enemy morally and physically by paralyzing and confounding him, by avoiding his strength, by quickly and aggressively exploiting his vulnerabilities, and by striking him in the way that will hurt him most. In short, maneuver warfare is a philosophy for generating the greatest decisive effect against the enemy at the least possible cost to ourselves—a philosophy for “fighting smart.” | |
| − | is a warfighting doctrine based on rapid, flexible, and opportunistic maneuver. Maneuver warfare | ||
| − | |||
| − | is a warfighting philosophy that seeks to shatter the enemy’s cohesion through a variety of | ||
| − | |||
| − | rapid, focused, and unexpected actions which create a turbulent and rapidly deteriorating | ||
| − | |||
| − | situation with which the enemy cannot cope. Rather than wearing down an enemy’s defenses, | ||
| − | |||
| − | maneuver warfare attempts to bypass these defenses in order to penetrate the enemy system and | ||
| − | |||
| − | tear it apart. The greatest effect of firepower is gen- erally not physical destruction— the | ||
| − | |||
| − | cumulative effects of which are felt only slowly— but the disruption it causes. If the aim of | ||
| − | |||
| − | maneuver warfare is to shatter the cohesion of the enemy system, the immediate object toward that | ||
| − | |||
| − | end is to create a situation in which the enemy cannot function. Inherent in maneuver warfare is | ||
| − | |||
| − | the need for speed to seize the initiative, dictate the terms of action, and keep the enemy off | ||
| − | |||
| − | balance, thereby increasing his friction. Also inherent is the need to focus our efforts in order | ||
| − | |||
| − | |||
| − | |||
| − | endurance and courage that all warfare demands, maneuver warfare puts a premium on certain | ||
| − | |||
| − | particular human skills and traits. Orienting on the enemy is fundamental to maneuver warfare. We | ||
| − | |||
| − | should try to understand the unique characteristics that make the enemy system function so that | ||
| − | |||
| − | we can penetrate the system, tear it apart, and, if necessary, destroy the isolated components. | ||
| − | |||
| − | If the enemy system, for example, is a fortified defensive works, penetrating the system may mean | ||
| − | |||
| − | an infiltration or a violent attack on a narrow frontage at a weak spot to physically rupture the | ||
| − | |||
| − | defense, after which we can envelop the enemy positions or roll them up laterally from within. We | ||
| − | |||
| − | should try to “get inside” the enemy’s thought processes and see the enemy as he sees himself so | ||
| − | |||
| − | that we can set him up for defeat. First and foremost, in order to generate the tempo of | ||
| − | |||
| − | operations we desire and to best cope with the uncertainty, disorder, and fluidity of combat, | ||
| − | |||
| − | command and control must be decentralized. Second, since we have concluded that war is a human | ||
| − | |||
| − | enterprise and no amount of technology can reduce the human dimension, our philosophy of command | ||
| − | |||
| − | must be based on human characteristics rather than on equipment or procedures. Our philosophy of | ||
| − | |||
| − | |||
| − | |||
| − | practical implications. First, we should establish long-term working relationships to develop the | ||
| − | |||
| − | necessary familiarity and trust. Second, key people—“actuals”— should talk directly to one | ||
| − | |||
| − | another when possible, rather than through communicators or messengers. Third, we should | ||
| − | |||
| − | communicate orally when possible, because we communicate also in how we talk—our inflections and | ||
| − | |||
| − | tone of voice. Fourth, we should communicate in person when possible because we communicate also | ||
| − | |||
| − | through our gestures and bearing. Commanders should command from where they can best influence | ||
| − | |||
| − | the action, normally well forward. As part of our philosophy of command, we must recognize that | ||
| − | |||
| − | war is inherently disorderly, uncertain, dynamic, and dominated by friction. In practical terms, | ||
| − | |||
| − | this means that we must not strive for certainty before we act, for in so doing we will surrender | ||
| − | |||
| − | the initiative and pass up opportunities. There are several points worth remembering about our | ||
| − | |||
| − | command philosophy. our philosophy requires competent leadership at all levels. Our philosophy | ||
| − | |||
| − | also requires familiarity among comrades because only through a shared understanding can we | ||
| − | |||
| − | develop the implicit communication necessary for unity of effort. Since our goal is not merely | ||
| − | |||
| − | the cumulative attrition of enemy strength, we must have some larger scheme for how we expect to | ||
| − | |||
| − | achieve victory. The first requirement is to establish what we want to accomplish, why, and how. | ||
| − | |||
| − | To influence the action to our advantage, we must project our thoughts forward in time and space. | ||
| − | |||
| − | Through shaping, commanders gain the initiative, preserve momentum, and control the tempo of | ||
| − | |||
| − | operations. The further ahead we think, the less our actual influence can be. The higher our | ||
| − | |||
| − | echelon of command, the greater is our sphere of influence and the further ahead in time and | ||
| − | |||
| − | space we must seek to shape the action. Decisionmaking is essential to the conduct of war since | ||
| − | |||
| − | all actions are the result of decisions or of nondecisions.Since war is a conflict between | ||
| − | |||
| − | opposing wills, we cannot make decisions in a vacuum. Time is a critical factor in effective | ||
| − | |||
| − | decisionmaking—often the most important factor. Decisionmaking requires both the situational | ||
| − | |||
| − | awareness to recognize the essence of a given problem and the creative ability to devise a | ||
| − | |||
| − | practical solution. Decisionmaking may be an intuitive process based on experience. | ||
| − | |||
| − | Alternatively, decisionmaking may be a more analytical process based on comparing several | ||
| − | |||
| − | options. We should base our decisions on awareness rather than on mechanical habit. Finally, | ||
| − | |||
| − | since all decisions must be made in the face of uncertainty and since every situation is unique, | ||
| − | |||
| − | there is no perfect solution to any battlefield problem. Mission tactics is just as the name | ||
| − | |||
| − | implies: the tactics of assigning a subordinate mission without specifying how the mission must | ||
| − | |||
| − | be accom- plished. Mission tactics benefits the senior commander by freeing time to focus on | ||
| − | |||
| − | higher-level concerns rather than the details of subordinate execution. Mission tactics serves as | ||
| − | |||
| − | a contract between senior and subordinate. It is obvious that we cannot allow decentralized | ||
| − | |||
| − | initiative without some means of providing unity, or focus, to the various efforts. We achieve | ||
| − | |||
| − | this harmonious initiative in large part through the use of the commander’s intent, a device | ||
| − | |||
| − | designed to help subordinates understand the larger context of their actions. There are two parts | ||
| − | |||
| − | to any mission: the task to be accomplished and the reason or intent behind it. The intent for a | ||
| − | |||
| − | unit is established by the commander assigning that unit’s mission—usually the next higher | ||
| − | |||
| − | commander, although not always. It is often possible to capture intent in a simple “. . . in | ||
| − | |||
| − | order to . . .” phrase following the assigned task. A clear expression and understanding of | ||
| − | |||
| − | intent is essential to unity of effort. Another important tool for providing unity is the main | ||
| − | |||
| − | ef- fort. We cannot take lightly the decision of which unit we designate as the main effort. Each | ||
| − | |||
| − | commander should establish a main effort for each operation. Put simply, surfaces are hard | ||
| − | |||
| − | spots—enemy strengths—and gaps are soft spots—enemy weaknesses. Gaps may in fact be physical gaps | ||
| − | |||
| − | in the enemy’s dispositions, but they may also be any weakness in time, space, or capability. | ||
| − | |||
| − | Similarly, a surface may be an actual strongpoint, or it may be any enemy strength. An | ||
| − | |||
| − | appreciation for surfaces and gaps requires a certain amount of judgment. Due to the fluid nature | ||
| − | |||
| − | of war, gaps will rarely be permanent and will usually be fleeting. In order to maximize combat | ||
| − | |||
| − | power, we must use all the available resources to best advantage. We accomplish combined arms | ||
| − | |||
| − | through the tactics and techniques we use at the lower levels and through task organization at | ||
| − | |||
| − | higher levels. In so doing, we take advantage of the complementary characteristics of different | ||
| − | |||
| − | types of units and enhance our mobility and firepower. | ||
| − | |||
| − | We have discussed the aim and characteristics of maneuver warfare. We have discussed the | ||
| − | |||
| − | philosophy of command necessary to support this style of warfare. We have discussed some of the | ||
| − | |||
| − | tactics of maneuver warfare. By this time, it should be clear that maneuver warfare exists not so | ||
| − | |||
| − | much in the specific methods used—we do not believe in a formularistic approach to war—but in the | ||
| − | |||
| − | mind of the Marine. In this regard, maneuver warfare, like combined arms, applies equally to the | ||
| − | |||
| − | Marine expeditionary force commander and the fire team leader. It applies regardless of the | ||
| − | |||
| − | nature of the con- flict, whether amphibious operations or sustained operations ashore, of low or | ||
| − | |||
| − | high intensity, against guerrilla or mechanized foe, in desert or jungle. Maneuver warfare is a | ||
| − | |||
| − | way of thinking in and about war that should shape our every action. It is a state of mind born | ||
| − | |||
| − | of a bold will, intellect, initiative, and ruthless opportunism. It is a state of mind bent on | ||
| − | |||
| − | shattering the enemy morally and physically by paralyzing and confounding him, by avoiding his | ||
| − | |||
| − | strength, by quickly and aggressively exploiting his vulnerabilities, and by striking him in the | ||
| − | |||
| − | way that will hurt him most. In short, maneuver warfare is a philosophy for generating the | ||
| − | |||
| − | greatest decisive effect against the enemy at the least possible cost to ourselves—a philosophy | ||
| − | |||
| − | for “fighting smart.” | ||
== Continous Improvement == | == Continous Improvement == | ||
Revision as of 06:16, 8 December 2010
Contents
Pre-Command
- Read the following:
* http://www.eveonline.com/pnp/terms.asp * http://wiki.eveuniversity.org/Ivy_League_Policies * http://wiki.eveuniversity.org/Wartime_Standard_Operating_Procedures * http://wiki.eveuniversity.org/The_Rookie%27s_Guide_To_Fleet_Ops * http://wiki.eveuniversity.org/FC_Guide * http://wiki.eveuniversity.org/Scouting) * http://wiki.eveuniversity.org/Tackling_101_Guide * http://wiki.eveuniversity.org/EWar_101_Guide
- Add the following to your in-game Address book
* Student Relations Manager - problematic fleet members
* Director of Personnel
* Director of Education
* Director of Logistics
* Director of Public Relations - hostile neutrals
* Current Diplomats
* Current War Targets
Command
- Who: Masao Battousai
- What: 90min, 50 man Patrol
- When: 15mins from announcement
- Where: Losec / Hisec
- Why: LoSec Pacification / War
- How: Covert Ops, EAF / Recon, E-war, Interceptors, Tacklers, Battle cruisers, DD
Pre-Fleet
- Arrange, Pin, and Close Windows
- Sort your overview by size (largest on top)
- Form a Fleet with yourself
- Disable free move
- Disable Voice
- Reset Broadcast Settings
- Set fleet view to hierarchy
- Disable Self Invite
- Disable Fleet Finder Advert
- Move yourself to wing Commander
- Create 4 squads (based on Wing Commander Skill)
- Do Check the forums, corp and alliance bulletin board, Corp / Alliance mail, Corporation war
status, the kill board, in-game map statistics, and corporation calendar for mitigating
circumstances
- Check for war targets online (Use locator agents)
- Have a route / Pipe in mind.
- Have a pad of scratch paper and a pen handy
- Join a TS Channel and set channel commander
- Create a command channel titled per TS channel
- Announce the fleet in the: TS combat lounge, Alliance, and Chat.e-Uni channels and ask scouts to convo You
- Convey the general nature of the fleet (who, what, when, where, why, and How).
Fleet
- Ask scouts how much experience they have in scouting and how long it takes for them to scan down a signature.
- Assign scouts to a random position in fleet
- Send your scouts ahead to probe and hunt down prey
- Place a call for squad commanders requesting skills, role, and shiptype
- Check age, employment history and titles when appointing leadership
- Assign leaders to squads as you see fit
- Invite your commanders to command chat and instruct them which TS wing to join as channel
commander.
- Assign a second in command / Alliance - Local watcher, Echo / broadcaster, D-Scanner, 4, 5
- Feed command channel Autopilot settings and destinations
- Instruct squad commanders to create squad channels that specify the Wing and Squad number (W#S#)
- Instruct Squad Commanders to build their own squads with a total 4 Ewar, 4 Tackle, and 2 DD (including themselves / Tackle vs. Scout)
- Maximum limit of half T2 Battle cruiser)
- Place an Alliance call for EAF and Recon
- Place an Alliance call for E-war
- Place an Alliance call for Interceptors
- Place an Alliance call for Tacklers
- Place an Alliance call for Battle cruisers
- Place an Alliance call for DD
- Place an Alliance call for all roles
Pre-Flight
- In Fleet chat, Instruct fleet members to join the appropriate TS Wing Channel
- Instruct your squad commanders to have themselves and their members x up with their role and ship type and to copy and past the info in an eve-mail to me.
- Instruct members to check that their clone is up-to date, no implants plugged-in they don't want to lose, their ship is insured, they are in Aldrat and at the POS, they're ship is renamed auto target back is set to 0, minimum of 5 ammo reloads in their cargo bay, drones in drone bay, guns and missiles are grouped, and all needed modules are online.
- Instruct members to ensure they have "Pilot is in your fleet", "Pilot has good standing", "Pilot is in your corportation", Pilot is in your alliance", Pilot has excellent standing" set above "Pilot is an outlaw".
- Instruct fleet members to add scouts, squad commanders, and wing commander to watchlist.
- Instruct squad commanders to add all scouts and squad members to their watchlist
- Instruct members not to be flying anything they can't afford to lose
- Instruct members to Zoom out as far as possible, to see the entire fleet and battlefield
- Instruct the fleet that they are free to engage flashies when departing a gate (DGC, align, and after a jump) but never when approaching a gate (OGC and exiting warp)
- Insturct members that their is no talking in Teamspeak without permission
- Instruct the fleet to Keep general chatter confined to squad chat, No talking in local, and no talking to neutrals or hostiles while in fleet (post in fleet channel if convo'd)
- Instruct members to X up in fleet Channel when: fired on by a neutral, warp scrambled, ship destroyed / pod destroyed. destroyed, need RR, have loot to transfer, or currently docked in system
- Instruct fleet members to ask in squad chat or command chat for reinvites
- Instruct the fleet to keep general chatter confined to their squad channel
- Instruct members to bounce planets for 1 minute and then dock and remained stationed if their ship is destroyed and purchase a shuttle or get in a rookie ship.
- Instruct fleet members to set their ship orbitals for optimal and to turn off brackets
- Review fleet rules and maneuvers for any new members (JOC, HOC, JJJ, JOC, OGC, DGC, A, Break, Break, Break, Hold Cloak, Check Check; T2 tanks and T1 frigate rigging Wartime rules)
- Clarify standing orders for DD: All firing on the primary. Target lock on the secondary and tertiary
- Clarify standing orders for E-war that regardless of a Primary, secondary, and tertirary being called: all Target Painters will consider their targets the FC called primary, secondary and tertiary; Tracking disruptors will consider their targets the Short Range Damage Dealers; Remote Sensor Dampeners will consider their targets the Long range Snipers / ECM ships; ECMs will consider their targets an ECM and Missile / Drone Boat.
- Instruct all Ewar otherwise to Place 1 racial module on thier primary and 1 on a target that has a character name that starts with the same letter as their own character name, or as close as possible; they should continue to do so up and down the alphabet until all modules have been assigned
- Clarify standing orders for tackers to target a character that has a name that starts with the same letter as their own character name, or as close as possible in the alphabet.
- Instruct tacklers to adjust their orbit to a minimum 7.5km, and all to attack drones
- Notify fleet and check improper command channel key ups with command, (Command - Name - Test)
- Do Ask for volunteer +1 and -1 pickets (Up and comming scouts)
- Have your +/- 1 pickets to initiate their Warp / Jump when a fleet align is issued.
* +1s should orbit and -1s align at the end of their movement
- Have your +/- 1 pickets to Jump / Warp to reposition themselves when the JJJ or JOC command is issued.
* -1s should orbit and +1s align at the end of their movement
- Instruct non command members of autopilot and security status penalty settings (Prefer safer and secure)
- Provide a personal disclaimer before departing : You shall defend, indemnify and hold harmless Masao Battousai and his alts, ILN superiors, and corporation; and their respective employees, contractors, officers and directors, from any and all claims, loss, damages and demands, including reasonable bounty fees, arising out of: Your obedience or disobedience to fleet commands; Your access to sensitive fleet intel; Your activation of any and all ship modules; CCP's Coding of the Game.
Flight
- Place a Global announcement in TS that you're taking out a fleet
- Give members a flight destination and test align times
- Pipe 0
1. Ihal 2. Mifrata 3. Sendaya onsooh Shmahi Kehrara Arena Uhtafal Abha Amphar Salashayam Janus Akhrad Uanzin Khabi Astabh Kenobanala Audesder Aedald Heild Bosena 4. Teonusude 5. Bosena 6. Oddeluf 7. Atlar 8. Illamur Meidolf Ennur Tabetzur Offikatlin Lirerim Diromitur Erlendur 9. Frulegur Erlendur Diromitur Lirerim Offikatlin Wiskeber Mateber Ofage Fuskunen Uemon Otosela 10. Tasti 11. Messoya 12. Akora
- Pipe 1
1. Todifrauan 2. Arnstur Gultratren 3. Ingunn Gultraten Arnsture 4. Helgatild 5. Brin Helgatild Todifrauan 6. Evati Anher 7. Hagilur Thelan Miroitem 8. Rancer Miroitem Thelan Hagilur Anher Evati 9. Ofstold 10. Lasleinur 11. Arnher 12. Egmar 13. Taff 14. Gukarla 15. Ualkin Taff Egmar 16. Orfrold 17. Klogori 18. Hadozeko 19. Resbroko 20. Uner Resbroko Hadozeko 21. Ardar 22. Floseswin 23. Uisper 24. Turnur 25. Isbrabata 26. Vimeini Aset 27. Eytjangard 28. Avenod 29. Aset Floseswin Ardar 30. Frerstorn 31. Gebuladi 32. Ontorn 33. Sirekur Frerstorn 34. Eszur 35. Ebolfer Eszur 36. Hofjaldgund 37. Dal 38. Lantorn 39. Vard 40. Siseide 41. Egghelend Siseide 42. Auga 43. Amamake 44. Gulmorogod 45. Bosboger 46. Lulm 47. Auga
- Pipe 2
1. Ohide 2. Kamela 3. Kourmonen 4. Huola 5. Roushzar 6. Labapi 7. Asghed 8. Arayar 9. Halmah Tararan 10. Sosan 11. Tararan 12. Arzad 13. Ezzara Arzad 14. Sifilar 15. Oyeman 16. Tzvi 17. Raa Tzvi 18. Lamaa Kamela 19. Sosala 20. Anka 21. Iesa 22. Uusanen Sosala Anka 23. Tannakan 24. Sahtogas 25. Saikamon 26. Haras Sahtogas 27. Oyonata 28. Kurniainen 29. Saidusairos Gratesier Schoorasana Mormelot Mannar Angatalie Lermireve Raeghoscon 30. Goinard Allipes Aetree Esmes Basan Shajarleg Sahda 31. Naguton Sayartchen Romi Aphend Dresi Gensela Shera Lor Cleyd 32. Vecamia Tarta Tekaima Tar Pakshi Renyn Du Annes Balle 33. Decon
- Pipe 3
1. Stacmon 2. Covryn 3. Iges 4. Uphallant 5. Dastryns 6. Ostingele 7. Harroule Ostingele 8. Agoze 9. Annancale 10. Brarel 11. Intaki 12. Vey Agoze 13. Loes 14. Ouelletta 15. Melmaniel 16. Costolle 17. Muetralle 18. Hevrice 19. Jovainnon Aeschee 20. Ladistier 21. Vifrevaert Ladistier 22. Old Man Star 23. Heydieles 24. Indregulle 25. Murethand Indregulle Heydieles 26. Abune Heydieles 27. Fliet 28. Deven
- Pipe 4
1. Osio Hysera Hasmijaala 2. Nagamanen 3. Hasmijaala 4. Hysera Hasmijaala Nagamanen 5. Otot Nagamanen 6. Sujarento 7. Eranakko 8. Onatoh 9. Tannolen Onatoh Sujarento 10. Tama 11. Kedama 12. Teimo Kedama 13. Nisuwa 14. Notoras Nisuwa 15. Hirri 16. Pynekastoh 17. Oinasiken Pynekastoh 18. Rakapas 19. Iwisoda Rakapas Pynekastoh 20. Hikkoken 21. Halanen 22. Enaluri 23. Nennamaila 24. Immuri Nennamaila 25. Aldranette 26. Vlillirier 27. Alsavoinon Vlillirier 28. Renarelle 29. Aubenall 30. Eugales 31. Frarie 32. Moclinamaud Renarelle Vlillirier Aldranette 33. Evaulon 34. Anchauttes 35. Esesier
- Pipe 5
1. Odamia 2. Alamel 3. Arderonne Alamel 4. Mantenault Alamel Arderonne 5. Reschard 6. Mercomesier 7. Athounon Mercomeiser Reschard 8. Alparena Reschard Arderonne Odamia Anchauttes Evaulon Aldranette Vlillirier 9. Oicx 10. Eha 11. Martoh Kehjari Ashitsu 12. Ienakkamon 13. Ashitsu Hykanima 14. Sarenemi Hykanima Villasen 15. Okagaiken Villasen 16. Hykanima Villasen 17. Kehjari 18. Villasen 19. Korasen Villasen Kehjari Martoh 20. Iralaja Martoh 21. Innia 22. Kinakka 23. Raihbaka Kinakka Innia 24. Pavanakka 25. Aivonen 26. Akidagi Nennamaila Hikkoken Pynekastoh Rakapas 27. Reitsato 28. Okkamon 29. Asakai 30. Elunala 31. Prism 32. Ikoskio Asakai 33. Vaaralen 34. Teskanen Vaaralen 35. Mushikegi 36. Manjonakko 37. Uuna 38. Ishomilken 39. Nikkishina 40. Hasama Mara Dantumi Aurohunen Vaajaita 41. Jan Vaajaita Aurohunen Dantumi Mara Passari Litiura Nonni 42. Aunenen Nonni Litiura Passari Mara Dantumi Aurohunen Vaajaita Jan Nalvula Hakonen Obe Ohkunen Mastakomon Osaa Otanuomi 43. Otsela 44.Ihakana
Pre-Fight
- Remind members to X up in fleet Channel when: fired on by a neutral, warp scrambled, ship destroyed / pod destroyed.
- Remind members to bounce planets for 1 minute and then dock and remained stationed if their ship is destroyed and purchase a shuttle or get in a rookie ship if possible.
- Have an Exit strategy in place and know when and how to get out if need-be
- Review target selection for each role
- keep commands to 6-7 words or seven words and detailed with who, what, when, and where
Fight
- Stay and warp-in with the fleet
- Repeat calls of primary, secondary, and tertiary and call targets according to threat
assessment based on your current fleet composition
Post-Fight
- Have your fleet align to a safe spot and have your tackler loot.
- Remind looters to note and trade / contract loot from wrecks back to corp mates
- Remind members to post kill mails and loss mails with a comment
- Have the fleet loot, salvage, and destroy wrecks
- Have tacklers transfer loot to a tanked DD
- Ask if any members need to repair
- Remind members to get a new clone if they are podded.
- Rotate and/or dismiss your pickets
Post-Fleet
- Instruct memberst to deposit all war target loot to ILN Hangar, and fleet loot to the sorting
hangar.
- Instruct memberst to reSet auto pilot settings
- Instruct memberst to Remove avoidance system settings
- Instruct memberst to Leave the fleet only after docking
- Instruct memberst to Leave their squad chat
- Instruct memberst to Remove channel commander from TS
- Instruct memberst to Leave the Teamspeak Wing channel
- Instruct memberst to Un-mute their microphones (if applicable)
- Instruct memberst to Comment on your AAR (provide a estimated post time)
- Copy and save your fleet log and EVE mails
- Write an After Action Report, including the: Objective of your fleet and the operational area; an explanation of what happened during the fleet operation; What you learned during this experience; a link to your ILN Patrol Log (if relevant)
Warfighting 101
The Nature of War
To understand the philosophy of warfighting, we first need an appreciation for the nature of war itself—its moral, mental, and physical characteristics and demands. War is a violent clash of interests between or among organized groups characterized by the use of military force. The essence of war is a violent struggle between two hostile, independent, and irreconcilable wills, each trying to impose itself on the other. The object in war is to impose our will on our enemy. Total war and perfect peace rarely exist in practice. Portrayed as a clash between two opposing wills, war appears a simple enterprise. The very essence of war as a clash between opposed wills creates friction. Whatever form it takes, because war is a human enterprise, friction will always have a psychological as well as a physical impact. While we should attempt to minimize self-induced friction, the greater requirement is to fight effectively despite the existence of friction. We can readily identify countless examples of friction, but until we have experienced it ourselves, we cannot hope to appreciate it fully. Another attribute of war is uncertainty. War is intrinsically unpredictable. Because we can never eliminate uncertainty, we must learn to fight effectively despite it. One important source of uncertainty is a property known as nonlinearity. By its nature, uncertainty invariably involves the estimation and acceptance of risk. Part of uncertainty is the ungovernable element of chance. Like friction and uncertainty, fluidity is an inherent attribute of war. It is physically impossible to sustain a high tempo of activity indefinitely, although clearly there will be times when it is advantageous to push men and equipment to the limit. Military forces will mass to concentrate combat power against the enemy. In an environment of friction, uncertainty, and fluidity, war gravitates naturally toward disorder. Each encounter in war will usually tend to grow increasingly disordered over time. By historical standards, the modern battlefield is particularly disorderly. The occurrences of war will not unfold like clockwork. If we are to win, we must be able to operate in a disorderly environment. War is a complex phenomenon. As a result, war is not governed by the actions or decisions of a single individual in any one place but emerges from the collective behavior of all the individual parts in the system interacting locally in response to local conditions and incomplete information. Because war is a clash between opposing human wills, the human dimension is central in war. War is an extreme trial of moral and physical strength and stamina. No degree of technological development or scientific calculation will diminish the human dimension in war. War is among the greatest horrors known to humanity; it should never be romanticized. Since war is a violent enterprise, danger is ever present. Leaders must study fear, understand it, and be prepared to cope with it. War is characterized by the interaction of physical, moral, and mental forces. Although material factors are more easily quantified, the moral and mental forces exert a greater influence on the nature and outcome of war. Because it is difficult to come to grips with moral and mental forces, it is tempting to exclude them from our study of war. War is both timeless and ever changing. One major catalyst of change is the advancement of technology. It is important to understand which aspects of war are likely to change and which are not. Various aspects of war fall principally in the realm of science, which is the methodical application of the empirical laws of nature. An even greater part of the conduct of war falls under the realm of art, which is the employment of creative or intuitive skills. the conduct of war is fundamentally a dynamic process of human competition requiring both the knowledge of science and the creativity of art but driven ultimately by the power of human will.At first glance, war seems a simple clash of interests. On closer examination, it reveals its complexity and takes shape as one of the most demanding and trying of human endeavors. War is an extreme test of will. Friction, uncertainty, fluidity, disorder, and danger are its essential features. War displays broad patterns that can be represented as probabilities, yet it remains fundamentally unpredictable. Each episode is the unique product of myriad moral, mental, and physical forces.
The Theory of War
Having arrived at a common view of the nature of war, we proceed to develop from it a theory of war. War is an extension of both policy and politics with the addition of military force. As the policy aims of war may vary from resistance against aggression to the unconditional surrender of an enemy government, so should the application of violence vary in accordance with those aims. To say that war is an extension of politics and policy is not to say that war is strictly a political phenomenon: It also contains social, cultural, psychological, and other elements. When the policy motive of war is extreme, such as the destruction of an enemy government, then war’s natural military tendency toward destruction will coincide with the political aim, and there will tend to be few political restrictions on the military conduct of war. There are two ways to use military force to impose our will on an enemy. The first is to make the enemy helpless to resist us by physically destroying his military capabilities. The second approach is to convince the enemy that accepting our terms will be less painful than continuing to resist. At the highest level, war involves the use of all the elements of power that one political group can bring to bear against another. Conflict can take a wide range of forms constituting a spectrum which reflects the magnitude of violence involved. Military operations other than war and small wars are more probable than a major regional conflict or general war. The nation’s force-in-readiness, must have the versatility and flexibility to deal with a situation at any intensity across the entire spectrum of conflict. Activities in war take place at several interrelated levels which form a hierarchy. These levels are the strategic, operational, and tactical. Activities at the strategic level focus directly on policy objectives. Tactics refers to the concepts and methods used to accomplish a particular mission in either combat or other military operations. The operational level of war links the strategic and tactical levels. The distinctions between levels of war are rarely clearly delineated in practice. All actions in war, regardless of the level, are based upon either taking the initiative or reacting in response to the opponent. The flux of war is a product of the continuous interaction between initiative and response. This discussion leads to a related pair of concepts: the offense and defense. The defense tends to be the more efficient form of warfare— meaning that it tends to expend less energy—which is not the same as saying the defense is inherently the stronger form of warfare. While opposing forms, the offense and defense are not mutually exclusive. Similarly, the defense is an essential component of the offense. This brings us to the concept of the culminating point, without which our understanding of the relationship between the offense and defense would be incomplete. The offense and defense exist simultaneously as necessary components of each other, and the transition from one to the other is fluid and continuous. These relationships between initiative and response, offense and defense, exist simultaneously at the various levels of war. Styles in warfare can be described by their place on a spectrum of attrition and maneuver. Attrition warfare may recognize maneuver as an important component but sees its purpose as merely to allow us to bring our fires more efficiently to bear on the enemy. Pure attrition warfare does not exist in practice, but examples of warfare with a high attrition content are plentiful. On the opposite end of the spectrum is warfare by maneuver which stems from a desire to circumvent a problem and attack it from a position of advantage rather than meet it straight on. Firepower and attrition are essential elements of warfare by maneuver. Like attrition warfare, maneuver warfare does not exist in its theoretically pure form. All warfare involves both maneuver and attrition in some mix. Combat power is the total destructive force we can bring to bear on our enemy at a given time. Combat power is the situationally dependent and unique product of a variety of physical, moral, and mental factors. Of all the consistent patterns we can discern in war, there are two concepts of universal significance in generating combat power: speed and focus. Speed is rapidity of action. It applies to both time and space. Since it is relative speed that matters, it follows that we should take all measures to improve our own speed while degrading our enemy’s. Focus is the convergence of effects in time and space on some objective. Since war is fluid and opportunities are fleeting, focus applies to time as well as to space. We achieve focus through cooperation toward the accomplishment of the common purpose. The combination of speed and focus adds “punch” or “shock effect” to our actions. Two additional concepts are particularly useful in generating combat power: surprise and boldness. By surprise we mean a state of disorientation resulting from an unexpected event that degrades the enemy’s ability to resist. The advantage gained by surprise depends on the degree of disorientation and the enemy’s ability to adjust and recover. While the element of surprise is often of decisive importance, we must realize that it is difficult to achieve and easy to lose. There are three basic ways to go about achieving surprise. The first is through deception—to convince the enemy we are going to do something other than what we are really going to do in order to induce him to act in a manner prejudicial to his own interests. The second way is through ambiguity—to act in such a way that the enemy does not know what to expect. The third is through stealth— to deny the enemy any knowledge of impending action. Boldness is a source of combat power in much the same way that surprise is. Boldness is the characteristic of unhes- itatingly exploiting the natural uncertainty of war to pursue major results rather than marginal ones. There is a close connection between surprise and boldness. To win, we must focus combat power toward a decisive aim. There are two related concepts that help us to think about this: centers of gravity and critical vulnerabilities. Each belligerent is not a unitary force, but a complex system consisting of numerous physical, moral, and mental components as well as the relationships among them. centers of gravity are any important sources of strength. We want to attack the source of enemy strength, but we do not want to attack directly into that strength. we should focus our efforts against a critical vulnerability, a vulnerability that, if exploited, will do the most significant damage to the enemy’s ability to resist us. We should try to understand the enemy system in terms of a relatively few centers of gravity or critical vulnerabilities because this allows us to focus our own efforts. Center of gravity and critical vulnerability are complementary concepts. The ability to take advantage of opportunity is a function of speed, flexibility, boldness, and initiative.The theory of war we have described provides the foundation for the discussion of the conduct of war in the final chapter. All acts of war are political acts, and so the conduct of war must be made to support the aims of policy. War takes place at several levels simultaneously, from the strategic direction of the overall war effort to the tactical application of combat power in battle. At the highest level, war involves the use of all the elements of political power, of which military force is just one. Action in war, at all levels, is the result of the interplay between initiative and response with the object being to seize and maintain the initiative. All warfare is based on concepts such as speed, focus, surprise, and boldness. Success in war depends on the ability to direct our efforts against criti- cal vulnerabilities or centers of gravity and to recognize and exploit fleeting opportunities. As we will discuss, the warfighting doctrine we derive from our theory is one based on maneuver.
Preparing for War
During times of peace, the most important task of any military is to prepare for war.Force planning is planning that is associated with the creation and maintenance of military capabilities. all force planning derives from a common set of concepts which describe how we will operate and perform certain key functions. Based on this common set of concepts, force planning integrates all the efforts of peacetime, including training, education, doctrine, organization, personnel management, and equipment acquisition. The operating forces must be organized to provide forward deployed or rapidly deployable forces capable of conducting expeditionary operations in any environment. The active operating forces must be capable of responding immediately to most types of crisis and conflict. For operations and training, Marine forces will be formed into Marine air-ground task forces (MAGTFs). Operating forces should be organized for warfighting and then adapted for peacetime rather than vice versa. Commanders should establish habitual relationships between supported and supporting units to develop operational familiarity among those units. Doctrine is a teaching of the fundamental beliefs of the Marine Corps on the subject of war, from its nature and theory to its preparation and conduct. doctrine does not consist of procedures to be applied in specific situations so much as it sets forth general guidance that requires judgment in application. Doctrine demands professional competence among its leaders. The military profession is a thinking profession. Leaders must have a strong sense of the great responsibility of their office; the resources they will expend in war are human lives. Warfare requires intelligent leaders with a penchant for boldness and initiative down to the lowest levels. Not only must we not stifle boldness or initiative, but we must continue to encourage both traits in spite of mistakes. Consequently, trust is an essential trait among leaders— trust by seniors in the abilities of their subordinates and by juniors in the competence and support of their seniors. Relations among all leaders—from corporal to general— should be based on honesty and frankness regardless of disparity between grades. The purpose of all training is to develop forces that can win in combat. entry-level training provides a common experience, a proud heritage, a set of values, and a common bond of comradeship. Basic individual skills are an essential foundation for combat effectiveness and must receive heavy emphasis. Commanders at each echelon must allot subordinates sufficient time and freedom to conduct the training necessary to achieve proficiency at their levels. In order to develop initiative among junior leaders, the conduct of training—like combat—should be decentralized. Training programs should reflect practical, challenging, and progressive goals beginning with individual and small-unit skills and culminating in a fully combined arms. Collective training consists of drills and exercises. Critiques are an important part of training because critical self-analysis, even after success, is essential to improvement. Professional military education is designed to develop creative, thinking leaders. The early stages of a leader’s career are, in effect, an apprenticeship. As an officer continues to develop, mastery should encompass a broader range of subjects and should extend to the operational level of war. The responsibility for implementing professional military education iis three-tiered: It resides not only with the education establishment, but also with the commander and the individual. The education establishment consists of those schools, subordinate commands, or outside agencies—established to provide formal education in the art and science of war. All commanders should consider the professional development of their subordinates a principal responsibility of command. Self-directed study in the art and science of war is at least equal in importance to maintain. Since war is at base a human enterprise, effective personnel management is important to success. The personnel management system should seek to achieve personnel stability within units and staffs as a means of fostering cohesion, teamwork, and implicit understanding. Finally, promotion and advancement policy should reward the willingness to accept responsibility and exercise initiative. Equipment should be easy to operate and maintain, reliable, and interoperable with other equipment. In order to minimize research and development costs and fielding time, exploit existing capabilities—“ off-the-shelf” technology—to the greatest extent possible. Acquisition should be a complementary, two-way process based on established operating and functional concepts. Equipment is useful only if it increases combat effectiveness. The acquisition effort should balance the need for specialization with the need for utility in a broad range of environments. As much as possible, employment techniques and procedures should be developed concurrently with equipment to minimize delays between the fielding of the equipment and its usefulness to the operating forces. There are two dangers with respect to equipment: the overreliance on technology and the failure to make the most of technological capabilities. There are two basic military functions: waging war and preparing for war. Any military activities that do not contribute to the conduct of a present war are justifiable only if they contribute to preparedness for a possible future one. Clearly, we cannot afford to separate conduct and preparation. They must be inti-mately related because failure in preparation leads to disaster on the battlefield.
The Conduct of War
How we propose to accomplish a mission is the product of our understanding of the nature and the theory of war and must be the guiding force behind our preparation for war. The challenge is to develop a concept of warfighting consistent with our understanding of the nature and theory of war and the realities of the modern battlefield. Our concept for winning under these conditions is a warfighting doctrine based on rapid, flexible, and opportunistic maneuver. Maneuver warfare is a warfighting philosophy that seeks to shatter the enemy’s cohesion through a variety of rapid, focused, and unexpected actions which create a turbulent and rapidly deteriorating situation with which the enemy cannot cope. Rather than wearing down an enemy’s defenses, maneuver warfare attempts to bypass these defenses in order to penetrate the enemy system and tear it apart. The greatest effect of firepower is gen- erally not physical destruction— the cumulative effects of which are felt only slowly— but the disruption it causes. If the aim of maneuver warfare is to shatter the cohesion of the enemy system, the immediate object toward that end is to create a situation in which the enemy cannot function. Inherent in maneuver warfare is the need for speed to seize the initiative, dictate the terms of action, and keep the enemy off balance, thereby increasing his friction. Also inherent is the need to focus our efforts in order to maximize effect. An important weapon in our arsenal is surprise. Besides traits such as endurance and courage that all warfare demands, maneuver warfare puts a premium on certain particular human skills and traits. Orienting on the enemy is fundamental to maneuver warfare. We should try to understand the unique characteristics that make the enemy system function so that we can penetrate the system, tear it apart, and, if necessary, destroy the isolated components. If the enemy system, for example, is a fortified defensive works, penetrating the system may mean an infiltration or a violent attack on a narrow frontage at a weak spot to physically rupture the defense, after which we can envelop the enemy positions or roll them up laterally from within. We should try to “get inside” the enemy’s thought processes and see the enemy as he sees himself so that we can set him up for defeat. First and foremost, in order to generate the tempo of operations we desire and to best cope with the uncertainty, disorder, and fluidity of combat, command and control must be decentralized. Second, since we have concluded that war is a human enterprise and no amount of technology can reduce the human dimension, our philosophy of command must be based on human characteristics rather than on equipment or procedures. Our philosophy of command must also exploit the human ability to communicate implicitly. This concept has several practical implications. First, we should establish long-term working relationships to develop the necessary familiarity and trust. Second, key people—“actuals”— should talk directly to one another when possible, rather than through communicators or messengers. Third, we should communicate orally when possible, because we communicate also in how we talk—our inflections and tone of voice. Fourth, we should communicate in person when possible because we communicate also through our gestures and bearing. Commanders should command from where they can best influence the action, normally well forward. As part of our philosophy of command, we must recognize that war is inherently disorderly, uncertain, dynamic, and dominated by friction. In practical terms, this means that we must not strive for certainty before we act, for in so doing we will surrender the initiative and pass up opportunities. There are several points worth remembering about our command philosophy. our philosophy requires competent leadership at all levels. Our philosophy also requires familiarity among comrades because only through a shared understanding can we develop the implicit communication necessary for unity of effort. Since our goal is not merely the cumulative attrition of enemy strength, we must have some larger scheme for how we expect to achieve victory. The first requirement is to establish what we want to accomplish, why, and how. To influence the action to our advantage, we must project our thoughts forward in time and space. Through shaping, commanders gain the initiative, preserve momentum, and control the tempo of operations. The further ahead we think, the less our actual influence can be. The higher our echelon of command, the greater is our sphere of influence and the further ahead in time and space we must seek to shape the action. Decisionmaking is essential to the conduct of war since all actions are the result of decisions or of nondecisions.Since war is a conflict between opposing wills, we cannot make decisions in a vacuum. Time is a critical factor in effective decisionmaking—often the most important factor. Decisionmaking requires both the situational awareness to recognize the essence of a given problem and the creative ability to devise a practical solution. Decisionmaking may be an intuitive process based on experience. Alternatively, decisionmaking may be a more analytical process based on comparing several options. We should base our decisions on awareness rather than on mechanical habit. Finally, since all decisions must be made in the face of uncertainty and since every situation is unique, there is no perfect solution to any battlefield problem. Mission tactics is just as the name implies: the tactics of assigning a subordinate mission without specifying how the mission must be accom- plished. Mission tactics benefits the senior commander by freeing time to focus on higher-level concerns rather than the details of subordinate execution. Mission tactics serves as a contract between senior and subordinate. It is obvious that we cannot allow decentralized initiative without some means of providing unity, or focus, to the various efforts. We achieve this harmonious initiative in large part through the use of the commander’s intent, a device designed to help subordinates understand the larger context of their actions. There are two parts to any mission: the task to be accomplished and the reason or intent behind it. The intent for a unit is established by the commander assigning that unit’s mission—usually the next higher commander, although not always. It is often possible to capture intent in a simple “. . . in order to . . .” phrase following the assigned task. A clear expression and understanding of intent is essential to unity of effort. Another important tool for providing unity is the main ef- fort. We cannot take lightly the decision of which unit we designate as the main effort. Each commander should establish a main effort for each operation. Put simply, surfaces are hard spots—enemy strengths—and gaps are soft spots—enemy weaknesses. Gaps may in fact be physical gaps in the enemy’s dispositions, but they may also be any weakness in time, space, or capability. Similarly, a surface may be an actual strongpoint, or it may be any enemy strength. An appreciation for surfaces and gaps requires a certain amount of judgment. Due to the fluid nature of war, gaps will rarely be permanent and will usually be fleeting. In order to maximize combat power, we must use all the available resources to best advantage. We accomplish combined arms through the tactics and techniques we use at the lower levels and through task organization at higher levels. In so doing, we take advantage of the complementary characteristics of different types of units and enhance our mobility and firepower. We have discussed the aim and characteristics of maneuver warfare. We have discussed the philosophy of command necessary to support this style of warfare. We have discussed some of the tactics of maneuver warfare. By this time, it should be clear that maneuver warfare exists not so much in the specific methods used—we do not believe in a formularistic approach to war—but in the mind of the Marine. In this regard, maneuver warfare, like combined arms, applies equally to the Marine expeditionary force commander and the fire team leader. It applies regardless of the nature of the con- flict, whether amphibious operations or sustained operations ashore, of low or high intensity, against guerrilla or mechanized foe, in desert or jungle. Maneuver warfare is a way of thinking in and about war that should shape our every action. It is a state of mind born of a bold will, intellect, initiative, and ruthless opportunism. It is a state of mind bent on shattering the enemy morally and physically by paralyzing and confounding him, by avoiding his strength, by quickly and aggressively exploiting his vulnerabilities, and by striking him in the way that will hurt him most. In short, maneuver warfare is a philosophy for generating the greatest decisive effect against the enemy at the least possible cost to ourselves—a philosophy for “fighting smart.”
Continous Improvement
- Know your hunting grounds and general travel route.
- Don't allow your self to be identified as FC of the fleet
- Remember to feed your scouts and fleet bookmarks
- Do Maintain comms discipline
- Don't let the fleet channel become a chat box
- Remember to provide BIO breaks
- Be Prepared to scout and run a wolf-pack if no scouts convo you
- Remember to enable loot logging
- Don't accept tacklers larger than a frigate
- Don't accept EWAR larger than a cruiser, or DD smaller than a cruiser / larger than a BC;
unless forming a BS fleet
- Remember to restrict Low-sec PVP fleets to E-UNI Members
- Do select your Squad and Wing Commanders wisely and choose leaders that you can work with.
- Don't let the SCs create 16 character channel names
- Do Invite EW first, Tacklers Second, and DD Third
- Don't accept or make role calls with ship class (Blackbird, Rifter, Scorpion, etc)
- Don't accept multiple role callers
- Do let your SCs invite members to fleet
- Remind Fleet members to mute their microphones if they're not in command channel
- Ewar determines fleet size!
- Remember to keep eyes on the target and system local count
- Remember to have scouts or bait position themselves behind the target(s) for the fleet warp-in
- Remember to keep your composure at all-times
- Remember this is just a game.
- Remember to speak clearly, moderately, and confidently
- Don't loose your composure for even a second
